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BINDING INTEREST ARBITRATION IN THE PUBLIC
SECTOR: IS IT CONSTITUTIONAL?
Strikes by firemen, policemen, and other public employees in
New York State in 1975 increased 100 percent in one year; the
number of public employees involved in these work stoppages
swelled 1800 percent.' Similar illegal' behavior, resulting in disrup-
tion of public services, is increasing rapidly throughout the United
States.'
In an effort to reverse the trend of work stoppages following dead-
locked negotiations,4 at least thirty-four states5 and a number of
1. [1976] GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 670 D-3, citing New York Public Employment
Relations Board 1975 Annual Report. In 1974 there were 16 strikes involving 4,100 public
employees; in 1975 there were 32 strikes involving 77,745 public employees. Id.
2. Alaska, Hawaii, Minnesota, Montana, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Vermont permit some
public employees to strike under specified circumstances. ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.200 (1972);
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 89-12 (Supp. 1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.64 (West Cum. Supp. 1976);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 41-2209 (Cum. Supp. 1975); ORE. REV. STAT. § 243.726 (1975); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1003 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1976-1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1730
(Cum. Supp. 1976).
3. [1976] GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 676, F-1-7, quoting Public Service Research
Council, Public Sector Bargaining and Strikes (2d ed. Aug. 1, 1976).
4. McAvoy, Binding Arbitration of Contract Terms: A New Approach to the Resolution of
Disputes in the Public Sector, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 1192, 1192 (1972).
5. The following 34 states have enacted 50 binding interest arbitration statutes covering
some or all public employees: Alabama, Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Indiana,
Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsyl-
vania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washing-
ton, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming. 1971 ALA. ACTS ch. 993, § 21(b) (mass transit);
ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.200 (1972) (policemen, firemen, jail and correctional institution employ-
ees, and hospital employees); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-473 (West 1958 & Cum. Supp. 1976)
(local); DEL. CODE tit. 2, § 1613 (1974) (mass transit); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 89-11 (Supp. 1975)
(state and local); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-6-4-12 (Burns Cum. Supp. 1976) (state and local); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 90.15 (West 1972) (firemen); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:890 (West Cum. Supp.
1976) (mass transit); ME. REv. STAT. tit. 26, § 965(4) (Cum. Supp. 1976-1977) (local); ME.
REV. STAT., tit. 26, § 979-D(4) (1964) (state); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 26, § 1026(4) (Cum. Supp.
1976-1977) (university employees); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, § 9 (West Cum. Supp.
1976-1977) (state and local); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 423.231-.240 (Cum. Supp. 1976-1977)
(police and firemen); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.38 (West Cum. Supp. 1976) (hospital employ-
ees); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.72 (West Cum. Supp. 1976) (essential employees); MONT. REv.
CODES ANN. § 59-1614(9) (Cum. Supp. 1975) (state and local); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-810 to
819 (Supp. 1974) (state and local); NEV. REv. STAT. § 288.200 (1973) (local); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 273-A:12 (Supp. 1975) (state and local); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-7 (West 1965) (state
and local); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:37A-96 (West Cum. Supp. 1976-1977) (mass transit); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 14-53-15 (1976) (mass transit); N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW § 205.3 (McKinney Cum.
Supp. 1975-1976) (police and firemen); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 306.12 (Page Supp. 1975)
(mass transit); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 548.1 (West Supp. 1976-1977) (police and firemen);
ORE. REv. STAT. § 243.712(2)(c) (1975) (state and local); ORE. REv. STAT. § 243.742 (1975)
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local governments' have enacted binding interest arbitration stat-
utes, giving a neutral arbitrator power to settle unresolved public
sector labor disputes arising during the negotiation of the terms of
a collective bargaining agreement. An arbitrator's decision is final
and binding on both the public employer and the public employee.
In theory, public employees will be pacified by turning disputed
matters, such as wages, over to an impartial arbitrator, who can
make a more rational finding than can an intractable public em-
ployer, cautious about spending the taxpayer's money.7
In reality, however, public employee unrest continues Moreover,
public employers and the electorate increasingly are alarmed at the
broad powers delegated to arbitrators who are accountable to no
one, and who, by awarding large salary and benefit hikes, indirectly
can force substantial budgetary reallocations and tax increases.' As
a result, some local governments, claiming either an inability to
pay'" or the unconstitutionality of binding interest arbitration
(police, firemen, guards at mental and correctional institutions); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§
1101.804-.805 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1976-1977) (state and local); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 217.4
(Purdon Cum. Supp. 1976-1977) (police and firemen); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 39951 (Purdon
Cum. Supp. 1976-1977) (mass transit); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 55, § 563.2 (Purdon 1964) (port
authority); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-9.1-7 (1968) (firemen); R.I. GEN. LAws § 28-9.2-7 (1968)
(police); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-9.3-9 (1968) (teachers); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-9.4-10 (1968)
(municipal employees); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-9.5-9 (Supp. 1976), reprinted in [1976 Reference
File - 124] GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 51:4817 (school administrators); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
36-11-9 (Supp. 1975) (state); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 39-18-17 (1969) (mass transit); S.D. COMPILED
LAWS ANN. § 9-14A (Cum. Supp. 1975) (police and firemen); TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-3802
(Supp. 1976) (mass transit); TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5154c-9 to -15 (Vernon Cum.
Supp. 1976-1977) (police and firemen); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-20a-7 (Supp. 1975) (firemen);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 925 (Cum. Supp. 1976) (state); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1733 (Cum.
Supp. 1976) (local); VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1357.2 (Cum. Supp. 1976) (mass transit); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 41.56.450 (Supp. 1975) (police and firemen); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
53.18.030 (Supp. 1975) (port authority); W. VA. CODE § 8-27-21 (1976) (mass transit); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 111.70 (West 1974) (Milwaukee police); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.77 (West 1974)
(police and firemen); Wyo. STAT. § 27-269 (1967) (firemen).
6. See, e.g., SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., ADMIN. CODE, art. XI.A, § 16.216 (1974), reprinted in
[1974 Reference File - 811 Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 51:1437 (local); NEW YORK CITY,
N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 54, § 1173-8.0 (1972), reprinted in [1972 Reference File - 40] GOV'T
EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 51:4167 (local).
7. See Barnum, From Private to Public: Labor Relations in Urban Transit, 25 INDus. &
LAB. REL. REV. 95, 111 (1971).
8. See [1976] GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 676, F-1-7, quoting Public Service Re-
search Council, Public Sector Bargaining and Strikes (2d ed. Aug. 1, 1976).
9. See, e.g., Dearborn Fire Fighters Local 412 v. City of Dearborn, 394 Mich. 229, -,
231 N.W.2d 226, 248 (1975) (separate opinion).
10. See, e.g., City of Buffalo v. Patrolman's Benevolent Ass'n (pending before N.Y. Sup.
Ct.), summarized in [1976] GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 674 B-10; Caso v. Coffey, Case
1400 E (N.Y. Sup. Ct., App. Div., decided July 12, 1976), summarized in [19761 GOV'T EMPL.
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laws," have refused to participate in arbitration proceedings 2 or to
honor arbitration decisions."3
This Note will focus on the constitutionality of binding interest
arbitration laws, beginning with a brief discussion of the social mil-
ieu surrounding the enactment of arbitration statutes. It will review
the various provisions found in binding interest arbitration statutes,
especially those covering public mass transit workers. A case law
analysis of constitutional attacks upon binding arbitration in the
public sector will be followed by a discussion of the difficulties in
creating an arbitration process that can harmonize the conflicting
demands of the general public, public employers, and employees.
Finally, guidelines will be recommended for insuring that arbitra-
tion laws are equitable to all parties as well as constitutional.
I. SOCIAL PROCESS: THE INTERESTS OF THE PUBLIC V. THE INTERESTS
OF THE PUBLIC EMPLOYEE
The number of state and local government employees has grown
substantially. In 1964 there were fewer than 8 million public em-
ployees; that number had risen to 15 million by 1974, comprising
16% of the total work force. 5 These workers have become highly
active," economic dissatisfaction being the primary cause of
strikes."'
REL. REP. (BNA) No. 667, B-5; Harney v. Russo, 435 Pa. 183, -, 225 A.2d 560, 564-65
(1969); City of Spokane v. Spokane Police Guild, - Wash. 2d - . 553 P.2d 1316,
1318 (1976).
11. See, e.g., Town of Arlington v. Board of Conciliation & Arbitration, __ Mass. -,
-, 352 N.E.2d 914, 916 (1976); Dearborn Fire Fighters Local 412 v. City of Dearborn, 394
Mich. 229, -, 231 N.W.2d 226, 228 (1975); City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, 37 N.Y.2d 19,
26, 332 N.E.2d 290, 292, 371 N.Y.S.2d 404, 406 (1975); Harney v. Russo, 435 Pa. 183, -,
255 A.2d 560, 561 (1969); City of Spokane v. Spokane Police Guild,__ Wash. 2d -, -,
553 P.2d 1316, 1318 (1976).
12. See, e.g., City of Spokane v. Spokane Police Guild, - Wash. 2d . . 553 P.2d
1316, 1318 (1976).
13. See, e.g., City of Biddeford v. Biddeford Teachers Ass'n, 304 A.2d 387, 389 (Me. 1973);
Harney v. Russo, 435 Pa. 183, -, 255 A.2d 560, 561 (1969).
14. U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook of Labor Statistics 1971,
at 304 (1971).
15. [1976] GoV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 676, F-5, quoting Public Service Research
Council, Public Sector Bargaining and Strikes (2d ed. Aug. 1, 1976).
16. In 1958 there were 15 strikes by public employees, one million of whom were union
members. There were 382 public sector strikes and over five million unionized public workers
in 1974. [19761 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 676, F-I quoting Public Service Research
Council, Public Sector Bargaining and Strikes (2d ed. Aug. 1, 1976).
17. [1976] Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 676, F-5, quoting Public Service Research
Council, Public Sector Bargaining and Strikes (2d ed. Aug. 1, 1976).
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Overburdened taxpayers, on the other hand, also have been
harmed by higher costs of living. They surrender a material portion
of their paychecks to the government and expect quality public
services at reasonable rates. Public officials, in an effort to appease
constituents, attempt to maximize the productivity of public em-
ployees as much as possible while holding public spending to a
minimum. Thus, at the negotiating table the government employer
may be unresponsive to employee demands for large wage increases.
Feeling no duty to accept meager salary settlements, public employ-
ees have resorted to more militant strike activity, sometimes with
chaotic results." New York City, for example, "was brought to its
knees in 1975 because of the overpowering strength of its municipal
unions."' 9 The government cry of "inability to pay" for public wage
increases is spreading." State legislatures have viewed binding in-
terest arbitration laws as a rational solution to the growing public
sector labor strife.2' Although enactment of these statutes has not
ended public sector work stoppages, preliminary indications show
that the statutes have eased labor relations.
18. For example, Kansas City firemen who struck illegally in 1975, were accused by city
officials of setting fires during the strike. Volunteer firefighters, fearing retribution from the
firemen, refused to give their names to newspaper reporters. In Baltimore in 1974, a public
employee union official was quoted by Governor Marvin Mandel as warning that the city
"would burn to the ground unless the city would give in to his demands."
The method of operation is to exploit the fears of the citizens and disrupt the
services for which citizens are taxed to insure capitulation to union demands.
The results of strikes in the public sector have been the following:
1. Loss of control of the political process to union officials.
2. Disrupted services.
3. Security suspended because of police strikes which result in near riots,
and harassment.
4. Fire protection withheld resulting in increased fires and fire hazards.
5. Health endangered through strikes of hospital and sanitation workers.
[1976] Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 676, F-6-7, quoting Public Service Research Coun-
cil, Public Sector Bargaining and Strikes (2d ed. Aug. 1, 1976).
19. [1976] Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 676, F-6, quoting Public Service Research
Council, Public Sector Bargaining and Strikes (2d ed. August 1, 1976). "Because of the
control of its affairs by union bosses," New York City was unable to pay its bills or provide
public services for which its citizens are taxed heavily. Id.
20. See note 10 supra. Wages paid to some city employees seem exorbitant. In San Fran-
cisco, for example, city street sweepers are paid $17,000 per year, city gardeners receive
$22,000, and starting salaries for policemen are close to $19,000. [1976] Gov'T EMPL. REL.
REP. (BNA) No. 676, F-5-7, quoting Public Service Research Council, Public Sector Bargain-
ing and Strikes (2d ed. Aug. 1, 1976). Employee compensation accounts for 66 to 80 percent
of city operating expenditures. [1976] Gov'T EMPL. REL. REp. (BNA) No. 667, B-6.
21. McAvoy, supra note 4, at 1192.
22. See Dearborn Fire Fighters Local 412 v. City of Dearborn, 394 Mich. 229, -, 231
N.W.2d 226, 231 (1975); McAvoy, supra note 4, at 1210-13.
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II. THE LEGAL PROCESS
A. Binding Interest Arbitration Statutes: Types and Provisions
All binding interest arbitration statutes23 have two elements in
common: first, all issues left unresolved after completing the con-
tract negotiation process are submitted to an arbitrator or a panel
of arbitrators; second, the arbitration settlement is final and bind7
ing on both parties. 4
Beyond these similarities, however, the provisions found in bind-
ing interest arbitration laws vary substantially. A number of stat-
utes provide for voluntary binding interest arbitration: the public
employer and the employee representative may, in their discretion,
present negotiation disputes to arbitration. 2 The majority of bind-
ing interest arbitration statutes, however, are mandatory, requiring
the parties to submit impasse issues to an arbitration panel if agree-
ment is not reached within a statutorily prescribed length of time2"
or if one party so requests.27
Arbitration statutes differ as to the classes of public employees
covered: some states, for example, have a single law applicable to
all public employees;28 others have a statute covering only police-
men and firemen. 9 The scope of binding arbitration also varies from
23. There are two types of binding arbitration statutes covering public employees: (1)
interest arbitration, involving an award that sets the term of a labor contract; and (2) griev-
ance arbitration, involving a decision that interprets the terms of an existing collective bar-
gaining agreement. See, e.g., Brown, Public Sector Collective Bargaining: Perspective and
Legislative Opportunities, 15 WM. & MARY L. REv. 57, 71-72 (1973). Further, some interest
arbitration statutes render an arbitrator's finding advisory rather than binding. See, e.g., R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 36-11-9 (Supp. 1975) (state), which provides for both binding and advisory
arbitration: "The decision of the arbitrator shall be binding upon both the bargaining agent
and the chief executive as to all issues and matters other than an issue which involves wages
and as to that issue, the decision shall be advisory in nature." This Note discusses only
binding interest statutes.
24. McAvoy, supra note 4, at 1193.
25. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 925 (4) (Cum. Supp. 1976) (state), which provides
that "an order determining the issue submitted to the board for resolution ... shall not be
binding on either party unless previously agreed to in writing by the parties."
26. See, e.g., WASH. Rv. CODE ANN. § 41.56.450 (Supp. 1975) (police and firemen), which
provides: "If an agreement has not been reached within forty-five days after mediation and
fact finding has commenced, an arbitration panel shall be created .... "
27. See, e.g., N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 209.4(c) (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1975-1976) (police
and firemen), which provides that "if the dispute is not resolved within ten days ... , the
board shall refer the dispute upon petition of either party to a public arbitration panel ....
28. See, e.g., HAWAII REV. STAT. § 89-11 (Supp. 1975).
29. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 423.231-240 (Cum. Supp. 1976-1977). Rhode
Island, however, has seven binding interest arbitration statutes covering various public em-
ployees. See note 5 supra.
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statute to statute. In one state, for example, an arbitration panel is
authorized to render a binding decision with respect to wages for
firemen, policemen, and mass transit workers,"0 but any wage deter-
mination for other public employees is deemed merely advisory.3'
Binding interest arbitration laws differ in many other respects.3"
For purposes of this discussion, however, it will suffice to outline
variations in provisions relating to the selection of the panel, the
terms of the award, the payment of expenses, and most importantly,
the protections against arbitrariness.
Most binding arbitration statutes require a tripartite panel: the
respective representatives of the public employer and of the public
employee union or association each choose one arbitrator; a third
arbitrator, serving as board chairman, is selected by the two ap-
pointed arbitrators3 3 either upon simple agreement 4 or from a list
of names supplied either by the American Arbitration Association 35
or by a public officer."6 The statutorily prescribed method of select-
ing the arbitrators is integral to the constitutional validity of a
binding interest arbitration law. For example, a delegation of legis-
lative power to an arbitrator appointed by a public official account-
able to the public is less vulnerable to constitutional attack than a
delegation of authority to one who is not responsible to the public.37
Furthermore, judicial involvement in the selection process is sus-
pect, possibly resulting in a claim of unlawful delegation violative
of the separation of powers doctrine. 31
The majority of binding interest arbitration statutes give the arbi-
trators absolute authority to determine the terms of an award. 39 A
few statutes, however, provide for "final offer" arbitration, requiring
30. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-9.1-9 (Supp. 1975) (firemen); Id. § 28-9.2-9 (Supp. 1975) (police-
men); Id. § 39-18-17 (1969) (mass transit).
31. Id. § 28-9.3-12 (1968) (teachers); Id. § 28-9.4-13 (1968) (municipal employees); Id. §
36-11-9 (Supp. 1975) (state employees).
32. For an excellent analysis of the various provisions found in binding arbitration statutes
see McAvoy, supra note 4.
33. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. tit. 26, § 965(4) (Cum. Supp. 1976-1977).
34. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-9.1-8 (1968).
35. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAws § 36-11-9 (Supp. 1975).
36. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.72(6) (Supp. 1976). Some statutes permit a judge to
choose the third panel member if the two partisan arbitrators are unable to agree. See, e.g.,
WYo. STAT. § 27-270 (1967). At least one law requires the state employment relations commis-
sioner to appoint an arbitrator. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.70 (jm)(2) (1974).
37. See text accompanying notes 106-11 infra.
38. See text accompanying notes 201-03 infra.
39. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. SElv. LAw § 209.4 (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1975-1976).
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that the arbitration panel choose the more reasonable offer made by
the parties during negotiations rather than draft the terms of its
decision. There are two types of "final offer" arbitration: one re-
quires the arbitrators to select the last "package" offer of the em-
ployer or of the union with respect to all unresolved issues;4 the
other permits the arbitrators to choose the employer's or the union's
final offer on each disputed item,4 thereby mitigating the possibil-
ity of unreasonable awards on some issues.4"
Statutes also vary regarding payment of expenses. Although some
arbitration laws provide that the state pay a substantial portion of
arbitration expenses43 and others leave the question to the discretion
of the arbitrators," most require that the public employer and the
public employee union share expenses.45 The latter statutory provi-
sion is a device that may encourage voluntary agreement by the
parties during negotiations: rather than attempting to compel
agreement during arbitration proceedings, this statutory scheme, by
increasing the expense of arbitration,4" seeks to discourage the par-
ties from maintaining impasse positions during negotiations.
The most important respect in which arbitration laws differ is in
their provisions for standards protecting against arbitrary, capri-
cious, and unfair exercise of discretionary powers by arbitrators.
Binding interest arbitration laws have been attacked primarily on
the ground that they unconstitutionally delegated legislative power
insofar as the statutes purportedly failed to provide adequate stan-
dards and safeguards to guide and control the arbitrators.47 Numer-
ous statutes fail to provide any standards at all,48 and others provide
40. See, e.g., EUGENE, ORE., CODE § 2.876(7)(g), (h) (1971), reprinted in [1975 Reference
File-104] GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 51:4621.
41. See, e.g., MIH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.238 (Cum. Supp. 1976-1977).
42. See Nelson, Final-Offer Arbitration: Some Problems, 30 ARE. J. 50 (1975); McAvoy,
supra note 4, at 1201. The method of setting the terms of the award may be important in
determining whether binding arbitration thwarts negotiations by encouraging disputes. For
example, a public employee union may feel it has a better chance of obtaining a suitable
settlement from an arbitration panel than from the public employer. The union, believing
an arbitration panel will make a compromise decision, may maintain unreasonable demands
during collective bargaining negotiations and thus create an impasse without serious discus-
sion of the issues. "Final offer" arbitration has been viewed as a means of ensuring that the
parties do not abuse the negotiation process. See McAvoy, supra note 4, at 1201.
43. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.807 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1976-1977).
44. See, e.g., Wvo. STAT. § 27-271 (1967).
45. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 288.200(3) (1973).
46. Clark, Public Employee Strikes: Some Proposed Solutions, 23 LAB. L.J. 111, 119 (1972).
47. See notes 112-177 infra & accompanying text.
48. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1357.2 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
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only general guidelines." Some binding interest arbitration stat-
utes, however, do mandate that specific standards be considered by
an arbitration panel."
In addition to variations in standards, binding interest arbitration
statutes vary in terms of procedural safeguards to protect against
arbitrary action by arbitrators. The majority of the binding arbitra-
tion laws empowering arbitrators to affect government spending
substantially, via wage increases, pension awards, and insurance
programs, provide for safeguards against abuse of discretion by arbi-
trators. Such provisions include hearings, written findings of fact,
verbatim record, written opinions and orders, and judicial review.5'
Similarly, if monetary expenditures are involved in arbitration pro-
49. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 111.70(4)(jm)(5) (West 1974). This statute, covering Milwaukee
policemen, is illustrative. The arbitration panel, in determining the proper compensation for
the policemen, must consider standard and cost of living indices.
50. For example, a Massachusetts statute covering policemen and firemen requires arbitra-
tors to consider:
1. [tlhe financial ability of the municipality to meet costs
2. [t]he interests and welfare of the public
3. [t]he hazards of employment, physical, educational and mental qualifica-
tions, job training and skills involved
4. [a] comparison of wages, hours and conditions of employment of the em-
ployees involved in the arbitration proceedings with the wages, hours and condi-
tions of employment of other employees performing similar services and with
other employees generally in public and private employment in comparable
communities
5. [tlhe decisions and recommendations of the fact finder
6. [t]he average consumer prices for goods and services, commonly known as
the cost of living
7. [t]he overall compensation presently received by the employees, including
direct wages and fringe benefits
8. [clhanges in any of the foregoing circumstances during the pendency of the
arbitration proceedings
9. [sluch other factors, not confined to the foregoing, which are normally or
traditionally taken into consideration in the determination of wages, hours and
conditions of employment through voluntary collective bargaining, mediation,
fact finding, arbitration or otherwise between the parties, in the public service
or in private employment
10. [t]he stipulation of the parties
Act of Nov. 26, 1973, 1973 Mass. Acts ch. 1078, § 4, reprinted in [1975 Reference File-109]
Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 51:3015 (expires June 30, 1977).
51. To illustrate, an Oregon statute covering policemen and firefighters, ORE. REV. STAT.
§ 243.742 (1975), requires the arbitration panel to hold hearings with respect to disputed
issues. Both parties are given an opportunity to present evidence and to cross examine
witnesses. Following the hearings, the arbitration panel makes written findings of fact and a
just and reasonable opinion and order based upon the record. Id. § 243.746. The award,
subject to judicial review, must be supported by competent, material, and substantial evi-
dence, id. § 243.752, and must be based upon extensive statutory standards. Id. § 243.746.
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ceedings, most statutes guard against potential budgetary problems
resulting from an arbitration panel's untimely award.52 A number
of binding interest arbitration statutes, however, require few protec-
tions against the arbitrary and capricious exercise of discretionary
power, even though the arbitrators may be delegated broad powers
to make wage and other monetary determinations.53
The statutes most devoid of standards and safeguards are those
covering mass transit workers.54 Unlike other arbitration statutes
enacted to prevent public sector strikes,5" laws covering transit
workers were passed in direct response to the requirements of sec-
tion 13(c) of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964.56 Most
mass transit systems were privately owned and operated until the
early 1960's; since then, however, many systems have changed to
public ownership. 7 As a condition to receiving federal aid, section
13(c) of the Act requires that states receiving federal mass transit
funding insure that mass transit workers retain the rights they en-
joyed as unionized members of the private sector."
52. Some binding interest arbitration laws provide that an arbitration panel's award will
not be given effect until the beginning of the next fiscal year. See, e.g., ORE. REV. STAT. §
243.752 (1975). Others seek to complete arbitration proceedings prior to the last day on which
money can be appropriated by a legislative body. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§
41.56.440, 41.56.450 (Supp. 1975). To ensure that arbitrators are aware of legislative appropri-
ations before rendering a binding award, Nevada's binding interest arbitration law requires
that the arbitration hearing be staged up to ten days following the adjournment of the
legislature sine die. NEV. REV. STAT. § 288.200 (1973).
53. Vermont's statute, for example, covers all municipal employees except teachers and
provides for judicial review but does not require hearings, written findings, verbatim record,
or written opinion. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1733 (Supp. 1976).
54. The following states have enacted binding interest arbitration statutes covering only
mass transit workers: Alabama, Delaware, Louisiana, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Penn-
sylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia. 1971 ALA. ACTS ch. 993, § 21(b);
DEL. CODE tit. 2, § 1613 (1974); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:890 (West Cum. Supp. 1976); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 40:37A-96 (West Cum. Supp. 1976-1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-53-15 (1976);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 306.12 (page Supp. 1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 39951 (Purdon
Cum. Supp. 1976-1977); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 39-18-17 (1969); TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-3802 (Cum.
Supp. 1976); VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1357.2 (Cum. Supp. 1976); W. VA. CODE § 8-27-21 (1976).
55. See McAvoy, supra note 4, at 1201.
56. 49 U.S.C. § 1609(c) (1970).
57. Barnum, National Public Labor Relations Legislation: The Case of Urban Mass
Transit, 27 LAB. L.J. 168, 168 (1976).
58. Id. at 169-71. For a local public transit system to receive federal funds, section 13(c)
(section 10(c) in the original act) provides that "[iut shall be a condition of any assistance
. . . that fair and equitable arrangements are made, as determined by the Secretary of Labor,
to protect the interests of employees affected by such assistance. Such protective arrange-
ments shall include, without being limited to, such provisions as may be necessary for ...
(2) the continuation of collective bargaining rights. ... Id. at 171, quoting Urban Mass
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In response to the requirements of the Act, a number of states,
having no similar law for any other group of public employees, have
passed binding interest arbitration statutes covering transit em-
ployees.5" Perhaps because these laws were passed by state legisla-
tures more concerned with receiving federal money than with har-
monizing public employer-employee relations, legislative draftsmen
have not been as careful to structure safeguards against abuse in
arbitration programs covering mass transit workers as they have
been in establishing arbitration procedures for other public employ-
ees.6 0
To the extent that local or state tax dollars are used to finance
public mass transit systems, an arbitration decision involving mon-
etary expenditures affects the expenditure of tax revenues. Binding
interest arbitration statutes for mass transit workers are therefore
unique among arbitration laws entailing public expenditures, inso-
far as they contain no standards or safeguards.
B. Challenges to the Constitutionality of Binding Interest
Arbitration Statutes
Although the United States Supreme Court never has considered
the issue, ten state supreme courts, including five since 1975, have
rendered decisions regarding the constitutionality of binding inter-
est arbitration statutes enacted by state legislatures for public em-
ployees." The principal constitutional challenge has been that bind-
Transit Act of 1964, § 13(c), 49 U.S.C. § 1609(c) (1976). Although the Act does not detail the
procedure for maintaining the collective bargaining rights of transit employees, it does specify
that the Secretary of Labor must certify that protective requirements have been met. These
safeguards are listed in collective bargaining agreements, -commonly called "13(c) Agree-
ments," executed between the transit system and the unions. Id. Almost invariably, "13(c)
Agreements" provide for binding arbitration of disputed labor issues. Id. at 173.
59. Barnum, supra note 57, at 174.
60. None of the arbitration laws covering transit workers establishes standards to guide
arbitrators in making an award or provides procedural safeguards against arbitariness. Vir-
ginia's binding interest arbitration statute covering transit workers, for example, says merely
that "[the employees of any transit facility ... shall have the right, in the case of any labor
dispute relating to the terms and conditions of their employment for the purpose of resolving
such dispute, to submit the dispute to final and binding arbitration by an impartial umpire
or board of arbitration acceptable to the parties." VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1357.2 (Supp. 1976).
61. City of Biddeford v. Biddeford Teachers Ass'n, 304 A.2d 387 (Me. 1973); Town of
Arlington v. Board of Conciliation & Arbitration, - Mass. -, 352 N.E.2d 914 (1976);
Dearborn Fire Fighters Local 412 v. City of Dearborn, 394 Mich. 229, 231 N.W.2d 226 (1975);
School Dist. of Seward Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist., 188 Neb. 772, 199 N.W.2d 752 (1972);
City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, 37 N.Y.2d 19, 332 N.E.2d 290, 371 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1975); Harney
v. Russo, 435 Pa. 183, 225 A.2d 560 (1969); Erie Firefighters Local 293 v. Gardner, 406 Pa.
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ing interest arbitration statutes create an unlawful delegation of
legislative power and discretion to arbitrators. Other objections to
the validity of binding interest arbitration statutes include charges
that they violate the separation of powers doctrine as well as four-
teenth amendment constraints.
1. Unlawful Delegation of Legislative Power to Arbitrators
The most significant challenges to binding interest arbitration
laws originate in the theory that because the state constitution vests
the legislature with the power to appropriate public funds, this
power cannot be delegated lawfully to arbitrators.2 Those conceding
that such delegations are lawful argue the narrower proposition that
these statutes are invalid because of inadequate safeguards and
standards. 3
Neither the federal nor state constitutions explicitly state the
criteria for determining the validity of a delegation of legislative
power.6  Nevertheless, absent a "ripper clause" in a state constitu-
tion, a state legislature apparently may delegate power to appropri-
ate public money to arbitrators through binding interest arbitration
laws, provided standards and safeguards are included to limit an
arbitrator's discretionary decision making." Authority to delegate
to arbitrators is not so clear, however, if a local legislative body,
such as a city council, is the delegating party.6
a. Delegation in States Having "Ripper Clauses"
At least seven state constitutions include "ripper clauses" 7 ex-
395, 178 A.2d 691 (1962); City of Warwick v. Warwick Regular Firemen's Ass'n, 106 R.I. 109,
256 A.2d 206 (1969); City of Sioux Falls v. Sioux Falls Firefighters Local 814, - S.D. ,
234 N.W.2d 35 (1975); City of Spokane v. Spokane Police Guild, - Wash. 2d - , 553
P.2d 1316 (1976); Wyoming ex rel. Fire Fighters Local 946 v. City of Laramie, 437 P.2d 295
(Wyo. 1968).
62. McAvoy, supra note 4, at 1205.
63. See notes 112-177 infra & accompanying text.
64. Dearborn Fire Fighters Local 412 v. City of Dearborn, 394 Mich. 229, -, 231 N.W.2d
226, 252 (1975), citing 1 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 73 (4th ed.
C. Sands 1972).
65. See notes 67-190 infra & accompanying text.
66. See notes 191-199 infra & accompanying text.
67. CAL. CONST. art. 11, § 11(a); COLO. CONST. art. 5, § 35; MONT. CONST. art. 5, § 36; PA.
CONST. art. 3, § 31; S.D. CONST. art. 3, § 26; UTAH CONST. art. 6, § 29; Wvo. CONST. art. 3, §
37.
Ripper clause provisions generally follow the wording of the Pennsylvania Constitution,
which reads in part: "The General Assembly shall not delegate to any special commission,
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pressly prohibiting the state legislature from delegating to a special
or private body any power to interfere with municipal moneys or to
perform municipal functions.68 Three state supreme courts69 and one
lower court 0 have interpreted the ripper clause with respect to bind-
ing interest arbitration statutes. Although there is a division among
the jurisdictions, the weight of authority indicates that a ripper
clause prohibits a state legislature from delegating to arbitrators the
power to spend public funds.7
In Erie Firefighters Local 293 v. Gardner,7" the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania held that a state law requiring binding interest arbi-
tration was an unconstitutional violation of the state's ripper clause.
The court reasoned that the power to fix salaries and to create a
pension plan for city firemen could not be delegated to a board of
arbitrators, because such power, involving purely municipal func-
tions, could be vested only in the city.73 Following Erie Firefighters,
the ripper clause in the Pennsylvania Constitution was amended to
permit expressly the legislature to delegate power pursuant to bind-
ing interest arbitration statutes covering policemen and firemen. 4
private corporation or association, any power to make, supervise or interfere with any munici-
pal improvement, money, property, or effects, whether held in trust or otherwise, or to levy
taxes or perform any municipal function whatever." PA. CONST. art. 3, § 31.
68. Porter, The Ripper Clause in State Constitutional Law: An Early Urban Experi-
ment-Part 1, 1969 UTAH L. REV. 287, 309.
69. See Erie Firefighters Local 293 v. Gardner, 406 Pa. 395, 178 A.2d 691 (1962); City of
Sioux Falls v. Sioux Falls Firefighters Local 814, - S.D. __, 234 N.W.2d 35 (1975);
Wyoming ex rel. Fire Fighters Local 946 v. City of Laramie, 437 P.2d 295 (Wyo. 1968). See
also Harney v. Russo, 435 Pa. 183, 225 A.2d 560 (1969); Division 85, Amalgamated Transit
Union v. Port Auth., 417 Pa. 299, 208 A.2d 271 (1965).
70. [1976] Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 671, B-18. In June, 1976, the binding arbitra-
tion provisions of the Utah Fire Fighters' Negotiations Act were held "an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative functions ... " Id. The binding interest arbitration statute created
"a commission to perform municipal functions contrary to the provisions of. . .the Utah
constitution." Id.
71. See notes 72-91 infra & accompanying text.
72. 406 Pa. 395, 178 A.2d 691 (1962).
73. Id. at -, 178 A.2d at 695.
74. The Pennsylvania ripper clause now reads:
The General Assembly shall not delegate to any special commission, private
corporation or association, any power to make, supervise or interfere with any
municipal improvement, money, property or effects, whether held in trust or
otherwise, or to levy taxes or perform any municipal function whatever. Not-
withstanding the foregoing limitation or any other provision of the Constitution,
the General Assembly may enact laws which provide that the findings of panels
or commissions, selected and acting in accordance with law for the adjustment
or settlement of grievances or disputes or for collective bargaining between
policemen and firemen and their public employers shall be binding upon all
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Despite its state's ripper clause,75 the Supreme Court of Wyoming
in Wyoming ex rel. Fire Fighters Local 946 v. City of Laramie"
upheld a statute providing for binding arbitration of labor disputes
between firemen and their municipal employers. Because arbitra-
tion of labor disputes was common in the private sector, the court
denied that administration of arbitration proceedings -could be
deemed a purely municipal function. As the legislature had granted
the city authority to pay and employ firemen, it could limit that
authority by requiring the city to submit to arbitration. Thus, the
court reasoned, the binding arbitration statute did not violate the
constitution's ripper clause."
In Laramie, the court noted further that an arbitrator's wage
increase award was not an interference with municipal moneys
within the meaning of the constitutional provision prohibiting dele-
gation of legislative power.7" Purporting to follow the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania's decision in Division 85, Amalgamated Transit
Union v. Port Authority," and without challenging the same court's
holding in Erie Firefighters, the Wyoming Supreme Court stated
that the purpose of the ripper clause was to protect against the
exercise of the taxing power and of other purely municipal functions
by officials who might be unaccountable to the electorate. 0 The
Wyoming court's reliance on Amalgamated Transit, a case uphold-
ing a statute providing for binding interest arbitration of labor dis-
putes between a county-owned port authority and its employees,
seems misplaced in that the port authority had no power to levy
taxes or to pledge the credit of any political subdivision of the
state .8 Rather, it paid for wage increases by adjusting the fares and
rents it collected during the course of its operations.2 Because the
parties and shall constitute a mandate to the head of the political subdivision
which is the employer, or to the appropriate officer of the Commonwealth if the
Commonwealth is the employer, with respect to matters which can be remedied
by administrative action, and to the lawmaking body of such political subdivi-
sion or of the Commonwealth, with respect to matters which require legislative
action, to take the action necessary to carry out such findings.
PA. CONST. art. 3, § 31.
75. WYO. CONST. art. 3, § 37.
76. 437 P.2d 295 (Wyo. 1968).
77. Id. at 300.
78. Id. at 301.
79. 417 Pa. 299, 208 A.2d 271 (1965).
80. 437 P.2d at 299-300.
81. See 417 Pa. at -, 208 A.2d at 274.
82. Id. at -, 208 A.2d at 274.
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ripper clause had been designed to prevent separating the power to
incur debts from the duty to provide for their payment by taxation,
the Pennsylvania court held in Amalgamated Transit that any in-
terference by a board of arbitrators was immaterial because it did
not deal with municipal money in the sense contemplated by the
ripper clause. 3 The Wyoming court in Laramie did, however, distin-
guish Erie Firefighters, a case holding the delegation of power to the
arbitrators violated the ripper clause, because, in Erie Firefighters,
the arbitrator's findings might have created debts and obligations
that the city would have had to pay with tax dollars. 4 Such a dis-
tinction appears invalid in that the arbitration panel in Laramie
also had the power to create debts by awarding an increase in fire-
men's wages, which was to be satisfied out of tax revenues.
In City of Sioux Falls v. Sioux Falls Firefighters,5 a case holding
that a binding interest arbitration statute violated the state consti-
tution's ripper clause,8 the Supreme Court of South Dakota criti-
cized the Laramie decision, 7 emphasizing that the ripper clause was
intended to prohibit legislative interference in municipal affairs.
Because the statute abrogated the city's authority to fix firemen's
salaries, a distinctly municipal function,8 the court held the statute
was "clearly unconstitutional."" Consistent with these holdings of
the Pennsylvania and South Dakota courts, a Utah district court
recently invalidated a binding interest arbitration statute covering
city firemen on the ground that it "creates a commission to perform
municipal functions" 0 contrary to the ripper clause in the Utah
Constitution."' Thus, in general it appears that a state constitution
containing a ripper clause prohibits any delegation of powers to
arbitrators that would enable them to increase the debt of any polit-
ical subdivision of a state.
b. Delegation in States Not Having "Ripper Clauses"
Most state constitutions do not contain a ripper clause prohibit-
ing the delegation of legislative powers to an arbitration panel.
83. Id. at -, 208 A.2d at 274 n.6.
84. 437 P.2d at 301.
85. - S.D. -, 234 N.W.2d 35 (1975).
86. S.D. CONST. art. 3, § 26 (referendum to repeal submitted to voters November 2, 1976).
87. - S.D. at -. , 234 N.W.2d at 36.
88. Id. at -, 234 N.W.2d at 37-38.
89. Id. at , 234 N.W.2d at 38.
90. [1976] Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 671, B-18.
91. UTAH CONST. art. 6, § 29.
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Nonetheless, in several state supreme court cases, arbitration laws
have been challenged, albeit unsuccessfully, as an unconstitutional
delegation of power by the state legislature. 2 Four theories have
been advanced: (1) the legislature cannot delegate its power at all;
(2) the legislature cannot delegate to arbitrators, who are unac-
countable private persons; (3) the legislature cannot delegate with-
out providing adequate standards and safeguards; (4) the legislature
cannot delegate taxing powers to arbitrators.
(1) Can the Legislature Delegate?
Although a legislature may delegate its power if the state consti-
tution so provides,9 3 most state constitutions do not describe explic-
itly the scope of the legislature's delegable authority. Typically, a
state constitution provides that the legislative power shall be vested
in two houses but fails to specify whether the legislative body can
delegate its constitutional power.' Several state supreme court
cases have reiterated the non-delegation language of the Supreme
Court,95 which as recently as 1932 asserted: "That the legislative
power of Congress cannot be delegated is, of course, clear.""6
State supreme courts seeking to circumvent the proposition that
legislative power may not be delegated have argued that "filling up
the details" is not an exercise of legislative authority. 7 Similarly,
92. See Town of Arlington v. Board of Conciliation & Arbitration, - Mass. - , 352
N.E.2d 914 (1976); School Dist. of Seward Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist., 188 Neb. 772, 199
N.W.2d 752 (1972); City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, 37 N.Y.2d 19, 332 N.E.2d 290, 371
N.Y.S.2d 404 (1975); Hamey v. Russo, 435 Pa. 183, 255 A.2d 560 (1969); Division 85, Amal-
gamated Transit Union v. Port Auth., 417 Pa. 299, 208 A.2d 271 (1965); City of Warwick v.
Warwick Regular Firemen's Ass'n, 106 R.I. 109, 256 A.2d 206 (1969); City of Spokane v.
Spokane Police Guild, - Wash. 2d -, 553 P.2d 1316 (1976); Wyoming ex rel. Fire
Fighters Local 946 v. City of Laramie, 437 P.2d 295 (Wyo. 1968). See also City of Biddeford
v. Biddeford Teachers Ass'n, 304 A.2d 387 (Me. 1973) (court divided on adequacy of stan-
dards); Dearborn Fire Fighters Local 412 v. City of Dearborn, 394 Mich. 229, 231 N.W.2d 226
(1975) (court divided on accountability of private citizens).
93. See School Dist. of Seward Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist., 188 Neb. 772, -, 199 N.W.2d
752, 756 (1972); Harney v. Russo, 435 Pa. 183, -, 255 A.2d 560, 563 (1969). See also
Dearborn Fire Fighters Local 412 v. City of Dearborn, 394 Mich. 229, 231 N.W.2d 226 (1975).
The Michigan supreme court, discussing a challenge to a binding interest arbitration statute
covering firefighters, said that the power to delegate resolving authority is implicit in the
legislative power conferred by the constitution to enact laws providing for the resolution of
disputes concerning public employees. Id. at 231 N.W. 2d at 230.
94. See, e.g., R.I. CONST. art. 4, § 2.
95. 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2.07, at 102 (1958).
96. United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77, 85 (1932).
97. 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 95 § 2.07, at 102.
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several state supreme courts considering the authority of the legisla-
ture to delegate discretionary powers to arbitrators pursuant to
binding interest arbitration statutes have made the following dis-
tinction: although the power to make a law cannot be delegated, the
power to implement an existing law may be." Yet, as noted by
Professor Davis, one exercising discretion under the law in reality
has power to make the law.9
Other courts reviewing binding interest arbitration laws have
taken a more reasonable approach to the non-delegation doctrine,
with one concluding, for example, that the legislature can delegate
its power if necessary to effectuate antecedent legislation., ' " Another
court upheld binding interest arbitration because of the "rational
reason" for choosing the device, that is, providing public employees
with sources other than the government for relief of labor prob-
lems.' 01
Thus, despite the language used by some courts, in the absence
of a constitutional provision explicitly prohibiting delegation, a
state legislature can delegate authority to arbitrators pursuant to
binding interest arbitration statutes.
(2) Can the Legislature Delegate to Arbitrators Who
Are Unaccountable Private Citizens?
Several courts have stated that delegations to a nonpublic agency
or to private parties unaccountable to the public are unlawful.',"
98. See, e.g., Wyoming ex rel. Fire Fighters Local 946 v. City of Laramie, 437 P.2d 295,
301 (Wyo. 1968); Erie Firefighters Local 293 v. Gardner, 406 Pa. 395, -, 178 A.2d 691, 695
(1962). The Supreme Court of Wyoming in Laramie, for example, said the legislature alone
had authority to fix firemen's wages; instead of setting the exact amount of wages, however,
the legislature elected to fix the minimum amount to be paid, with administrative authority
in the city to pay wages in excess of such amount. Rather than creating a maximum, the
legislature provided a formula through the medium of interest arbitration for setting a specific
amount above the minimum in the event the firefighters exercised their statutory right to
enter into a collective bargaining agreement with the city. Stating that power to make laws
could not be delegated, the court asserted that nothing in the binding interest arbitration
statute suggested the administrative powers of the arbitrator constituted any delegated power
to legislate, for granting the power to execute a law already in existence is not a delegation
of legislative authority. 437 P.2d at 301.
99. 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 95, § 2.07, at 102.
100. Jennings v. Exeter-West Greenwich Regional School Dist. Comm., - R.I. -
-, 352 A.2d 634, 638 (1976), citing City of Warwick v. Warwick Regular Firemen's Ass'n,
106 R.I. 109, 256 A.2d 206 (1969).
101. City of Biddeford v. Biddeford Teachers Ass'n, 304 A.2d 387, 398 (Me. 1973).
102. See, e.g., Dearborn Fire Fighters Local 412 v. City of Dearborn, 394 Mich. 229, -,
231 N.W.2d 226, 228 (1975); City of Sioux Falls v. Sioux Falls Firefighters Local 814, -
S.D. ..- , 234 N.W.2d 35, 36 (1975).
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Yet, no binding interest arbitration statutes enacted by state legis-
latures have been invalidated merely because the courts considered
the arbitration panels to be committees of private citizens. Even
courts concluding that arbitrators were private citizens have held
that the legislature could delegate to them "limited portions of its
sovereign power"'" 3 provided the delegation was accompanied by
adequate standards and safeguards. 04 Thus, regardless of some
courts' language to the contrary,'05 an arbitrator's public or private
status seems irrelevant to the validity of binding interest arbitration
statutes; his accountability to the public, however, is significant.
In Dearborn Fire Fighters Local 412 v. City of Dearborn'° the
Michigan Supreme Court examined the issue of accountability in
depth. The binding interest arbitration statute provided for ad hoc
panels composed of three members: two partisan arbitrators and a
chairman chosen either by them, or if they were deadlocked, by the
chairman of the state's employment relations commission. Al-
though one justice deemed the statute valid, 07 two justices held it
to be unconstitutional on its face in that its provisions for ad hoc
panels left the arbitrators politically unaccountable. 8 The latter
two justices asserted, however, that a law creating a permanent
board of arbitrators would insure public accountability, and as
such, would withstand constitutional challenge.' As a permanent
panel would be more costly and potentially more biased," 0 this view
probably will not be followed by other courts. Nonetheless, to guar-
103. City of Biddeford v. Biddeford Teachers Ass'n, 304 A.2d 387, 398 (Me. 1973).
104. Town of Arlington v. Board of Conciliation & Arbitration, - Mass. -, -. 352
N.E.2d 914, 920 (1976); Jennings v. Exeter-West Greenwich Regional School Dist. Comm.,
__ R.I. - -, 352 A.2d 634, 638-39 (1976).
105. City of Sioux Falls v. Sioux Falls Firefighters Local 814, - S.D. -, , 234
N.W.2d 35, 36 (1975); Dearborn Fire Fighters Local 412 v. City of Dearborn, 394 Mich. 299,
-, 231 N.W.2d 226, 252, 259 (1975).
106. 394 Mich. 229, 231 N.W.2d 226.
107. Id. at -, 231 N.W.2d at 243-44 (Coleman, J.).
108. Id. at -, 231 N.W.2d at 243 (Kavanagh, C.J.); Id. at -, 231 N.W.2d at 228
(Levin,.J. & Kavanagh, C.J.).
109. Id. at __, 231 N.W.2d at 243 (Kavanagh, C.J.); Id. at -, 231 N.W.2d at 243
(Levin, J. & Kavanagh, C.J.).
Although rejecting the view that permanence would guarantee accountability, id. at -,
231 N.W.2d at 265, a fourth justice contended the statute was valid as applied because one
member of each board was appointed by a state officer with a high degree of accountability.
Id. at _. 231 N.W.2d at 268. (Williams, J.). Justice Williams did conclude, however, that
delegations of legislative authority to arbitration boards composed only of partisan members
and their appointees were unconstitutional. Id. at __, 231 N.W.2d at 268.
110. See id. at -, 231 N.W.2d at 249 (Coleman, J.).
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antee the constitutionality of such statutes, provisions insuring
arbitrators' public accountability should be included; because arbi-
trators are neither public officials nor required to answer to the
voters or to their elected representatives, more stringent statutory
standards and safeguards to guide and control the arbitrators' exer-
cise of delegated authority are required."1'
(3) What Standards and Safeguards Are Required?
Assuming a state legislature is authorized to delegate some of its
powers to arbitrators, a binding interest arbitration statute still is
vulnerable on the ground that it fails to provide adequate standards
and safeguards to protect against unfair and arbitrary use of discre-
tionary powers." ' No arbitration statute covering public employees
has been invalidated by a state supreme court on this basis; never-
theless, the question of standards and safeguards is of increasing
concern. Binding interest arbitration statutes covering public mass
transit workers, which thus far have not been challenged on this
issue, seem particularly susceptible to attack on the ground that
they provide no standards and safeguards."13
Only one state supreme court has invalidated a binding interest
arbitration statute because of insufficient standards."4 That New
Jersey statute provided for compulsory binding interest arbitration
of private sector labor disputes between public utilities and their
employees. Although the statute prescribed a number of safeguards
against abuse of discretion by the arbitration board by requiring
hearings, written findings of fact, and a written decision and order
based upon the issues,"' the court deemed these protections insuffi-
cient, citing the particular need for objective considerations when-
ever the public ultimately must pay the awards granted."' More-
111. Id. at __ 231 N.W.2d at 257 (Williams, J.), citing City of Biddeford v. Biddeford
Teachers Ass'n, 304 A.2d 387, 402 (Me. 1973).
112. See City of Biddeford v. Biddeford Teachers Ass'n, 304 A.2d 387 (Me. 1973); Town of
Arlington v. Board of Conciliation & Arbitration, - Mass. __, 352 N.E.2d 914 (1976);
Dearborn Fire Fighters Local 412 v. City of Dearborn, 394 Mich. 229, 231 N.W.2d 226 (1975);
City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, 37 N.Y.2d 19,332 N.E.2d 290,371 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1975); Harney
v. Russo, 435 Pa. 183, 255 A.2d 560 (1969); Division 85, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Port
Auth., 417 Pa. 299, 208 A.2d 271 (1965); City of Warwick v. Warwick Regular Firemen's Ass'n,
106 R.I. 109, 256 A.2d 206 (1969); City of Spokane v. Spokane Police Guild, - Wash. 2d
-, 553 P.2d 1316 (1976).
113. See notes 54-60 supra & accompanying text.
114. State v. Traffic Tel. Workers' Fed'n, 2 N.J. 335, 66 A.2d 616 (1949).
115. Id. at , 66 A.2d at 619.
116. Id. at -, 66 A.2d at 625-26. As the court noted, if standards are lacking,
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over, the court added that standards are required especially if the
legislature mandates new patterns of social conduct such as arbitra-
tion of labor disputes."7
Subsequently, the New Jersey Legislature amended the binding
interest arbitration statute to require arbitrators to consider, in ad-
dition to other factors, the interests and welfare of the public, the
wages, hours, and working conditions of comparable work in other
industries and utilities, and the security and tenure of employ-
ment."81
Professor Davis criticized the New Jersey tribunal for stressing
the presence or absence of specific standards in a statute that pro-
vided adequate procedural safeguards against arbitrariness, and in
particular, required written findings of fact."9 Nevertheless, courts
apparently will scrutinize statutes that do not require arbitrators to
consider the public's willingness or ability to pay an arbitration
award.
The first decision reviewing the adequacy of standards provided
in a binding interest arbitration statute covering public employees
was Division 85, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Port Authority,120
a case in which the statute did not require the board of arbitrators
to consider any specific standards when rendering its award. The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld the statute, stating that the
announced legislative policy established "primary standards" suffi-
cient to guide the arbitrators in executing the legislative intent.' 2
Perhaps reflecting the modern tendency "toward greater liberality
in permitting grants of discretion . . . to facilitate the administra-
tion of the laws as the complexity of governmental and economic
the tendency to compromise and be guided in part by expediency as distin-
guished from objective considerations and real right is inevitable. . . especially
• .. in the case of an arbitration where the rights of third parties, here the
public, are concerned . . . .But the board of arbitration is nowhere directed to
consider the rights of the public, which will ultimately be called upon to foot
the bill. In these circumstances the need of legislative standards is peculiarly
apparent.
Id. at -, 66 A.2d at 625-26. Professor Davis has contended that if the legislature had
required the arbitrators to consider "the interests of the public, whose tax money is used to
pay the wages, . . . then the delegation might have been sustained." K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRA-
TivE LAW TEXT § 2.06, at 38 (3d ed. 1972).
117. 2 N.J. at -. , 66 A.2d at 626.
118. The statute as amended was upheld in New Jersey Bell Tel. Co. v. Communications
Workers, 5 N.J. 354, -, 75 A.2d 721, 734 (1950).
119. K.DAVIS, supra note 116, § 2.06 (3d ed. 1972).
120. 417 Pa. 299, 208 A.2d 271 (1965).
121. Id. at -, 208 A.2d at 275.
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conditions increases,"' 22 the Pennsylvania court stated that the leg-
islature may validly establish primary standards and impose upon
others the duty of implementing its policies in accordance with
general provisions.2 3
In Harney v. Russo"' the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania again
reviewed the constitutional adequacy of standards. There the court
upheld a standardless statute providing for binding interest arbitra-
tion of impasse disputes between policemen and firemen and their
public employers, on the ground that the Pennsylvania Constitution
recently had been amended 5 to permit such standardless delega-
tions of power, if the arbitrators adhered to the requirements of the
enabling legislation and of due process.' 6 The court added, in dic-
tum, that even if the constitutional amendment did not supersede
the standard requirement, the "obvious legislative policy [of pro-
tecting] the public from strikes by policemen and firemen" would
be an adequate standard for the arbitrators to follow. 7
In upholding a legislative delegation pursuant to a binding inter-
est arbitration statute covering firemen, the Supreme Court of
Rhode Island established criteria for evaluating standards in
Warwick v. Warwick Regular Firemen's Association."' According to
the court, the constitution mandated that any legislative delegation
be limited by standards "sufficient to confine the exercise of power
to the purpose for which the delegation was made."' 29 Although the
statute did not explicitly require arbitrators to consider the finan-
cial ability of the employer to pay an arbitration award, it did
require consideration of the general interest and welfare of the pub-
lic, as well as of prevailing wage comparisons, the hazards of em-
ployment, the employees' physical and educational qualifications,
and job training and skills. °3 After asserting that one important
122. Pressman v. Barnes, 209 Md. 544, 555, 121 A.2d 816, 822 (1956).
123. 417 Pa. at -, 208 A.2d at 275. Significantly, the arbitration panel in Amalgamated
Transit had no authority to create public debts or to levy or collect taxes. Id. at -, 208
A.2d at 275. The port authority was a self-sufficient public corporation that, as any business
in the private sector, relied on its operating revenues rather than tax dollars to pay for wage
increases. Id. at , 208 A.2d at 274. Thus, an arbitration award could affect the "interest
and welfare of the public" only indirectly by necessitating an increase in fares or a diminution
of transportation services. See notes 81-83 supra & accompanying text.
124. 435 Pa. 183, 255 A.2d 560 (1969).
125. See note 74 supra & accompanying text.
126. 435 Pa. at - , 255 A.2d at 562-63.
127. Id. at -, 255 A.2d at 563.
128. 106 R.I. 109, 256 A.2d 206 (1969).
129. Id. at , 256 A.2d at 211.
130. Id.
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criterion for evaluating the sufficiency of such standards is that they
should enable a reviewing tribunal to determine whether an arbitra-
tor's action was "capricious, arbitrary, or in excess of the delegated
authority,"'' 3' the court concluded that the standards established in
the binding interest arbitration statute fulfilled the test. 3
After its well-reasoned analysis, the court, in an aside, unfortun-
ately echoed the dictum of Harney v. Russo3 3 espousing the intrinsic
sufficiency of a legislative policy to prevent strikes as a standard for
arbitrators.'34 It is doubtful the court intended to adopt that theory;
for if the legislative policy statement were the sole standard regulat-
ing an arbitration decision, any award, regardless how unreasona-
ble, would satisfy the standard if it had prevented a strike by fire-
men. Consequently, under the court's own criteria, the legislative
policy statement alone is an inadequate standard, for it would not
aid in determining whether the arbitrators' actions were arbitrary
and capricious.
In City of Biddeford v. Biddeford Teachers Association, 35 the
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine was divided evenly on the issue
of whether a policy statement declaring the legislature's intention
to create more harmonious public employer-employee relations con-
stituted a sufficient standard to sustain an otherwise standardless
arbitration statute covering public school teachers. Although the
statute provided for binding arbitration regarding teachers' hours
and working conditions,"3 arbitrators' findings concerning salaries,
pensions, and insurance were to be advisory only. 31 Moreover, arbi-
trators had no jurisdiction to decide matters of educational policy.
Furthermore, the employees' representative was required to give the
employer notice of any financial issues at least 120 days prior to the
conclusion of the current fiscal budget.' 38 Three justices held that
because the legislative policy statement in combination with im-
plicit guidelines created a "primary standard" or "intelligible prin-
ciple" to prevent arbitrators from capriciously exercising delegated
power, the statute was constitutional. 39
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See note 127 supra & accompanying text.
134. 106 R.I. at __, 256 A.2d at 211-12.
135. 304 A.2d 387 (Me. 1973).
136. Id. at 390.
137. Id.
138. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 26, § 965(1).
139. 304 A.2d at 411-12 (Wernick, Weber & Pomeroy, JJ.).
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According to the three justices, the advisory status of any arbitra-
tors' decisions on salaries, pensions, and insurance, as well as the
notice requirement concerning financial issues, meant that the arbi-
trators must consider the monetary impact of an award. 40 Similarly,
the justices reasoned, because matters of educational policy were
excluded from binding arbitration, the arbitrators had to consider
the general interests of the public.' Moreover, as such legislation
reflects a public policy alternative to strikes, the arbitrators had to
consider what the teachers might win if allowed to strike.' Finally,
the justices deemed that the statute also implicitly contemplated
that the arbitrators were to act reasonably and fairly.' Although
the three justices deemed the preceding implicit standards suffi-
cient in themselves to sustain the statute, they added further that
because the statute provided adequate procedural safeguards it con-
stituted a valid delegation of legislative power.'
In contrast, the other three justices thought the binding interest
arbitration statute was unconstitutional for lack of sufficient stan-
dards to protect the employees and the public from irresponsible
exercise of power delegated to arbitrators,' for a statement enunci-
ating the legislature's purpose to create a more harmonious
employer-employee relationship is not "a meaningful criterion for
the arbitrators' determination, issue by issue, of the individual sub-
ject matters before them.""' In addition, the three concluded that
the statute's exclusion of salaries, pensions, insurance, and educa-
tional policies did not imply standards an arbitrator must consider
in making an award; the statutory exclusions merely defined the
boundaries within which the arbitrators may act. 7 Although con-
ceding that the legislature expected arbitrators to act fairly and
reasonably, the justices noted that such "an unspoken demand for
integrity" was implicit in every statute delegating power to admin-
istrative bodies, yet did not furnish any criteria to guide the arbitra-
tors regarding the factors to be considered in their examination of
the issues presented to them. 4 ' Moreover, the arbitration law failed
140. Id. at 412.
141. Id. at 414.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 412.
144. Id. at 412-15.
145. Id. at 400 (Weatherbee, Dufresne & Archibald, JJ.).
146. Id. at 401.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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to state adequately the scope of the arbitrators' authority because
the statute did not define or distinguish between the terms
"educational policy" and "working conditions."'49 Nor did the stat-
ute establish criteria to guide arbitrators when a single decision
might affect both educational policies and working conditions.'50
As such, the justices asserted that the binding interest arbitration
statute did not contain a "primary standard" to guide the arbitra-
tors and, in the alternative, that the "primary standard" or
"intelligible principle" test was insufficient to satisfy the constitu-
tional mandate for standards.5 ' Specific standards are required
whenever the arbitrators are not accountable to the electorate or to
their elected representatives and whenever their tenure is so brief
that they are unable to develop their own standards based upon
accumulated experience. 5 ' In addition to the insufficiency of stan-
dards, the procedural safeguards were deemed inadequate; because
the arbitration statute did not require that the arbitrators make
findings of fact, a reviewing court's ability to protect against unbri-
dled discretion was seriously limited.'53
The latter three justices' view that the Maine binding interest
arbitration statute was unconstitutional is the better reasoned posi-
tion, for the statute created no standards to guide the arbitrators
and lacked adequate procedural safeguards in that it required no
findings of fact. A statutory exclusion of salaries, pensions, and
insurance, and a notice requirement intended to insure the comple-
tion of arbitration proceedings in time sufficient to avoid budgetary
reallocation problems, do not establish standards that an arbitrator
could apply in considering the financial impact of his award.'54 Nor
does the unexpressed underlying legislative policy of preventing
public sector strikes require an arbitrator to consider what employ-
ees might receive if they were to strike. Moreover, the contention
that a statutory exclusion of matters of educational policy from
binding arbitration means that the arbitration award must reflect
the general interests of the public is indefensible.
Standards in binding interest arbitration statutes were deemed
sufficient in the four most recent state supreme court cases deciding
149. Id. at 402.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 400.
152. Id. at 402.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 401.
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the issue. 5 In each case the arbitration law covered public employ-
ees and gave arbitrators substantial power to create public debt. 5'
The statutes listed numerous factors for the arbitrators to consider
in rendering their awards, including the employer's ability to pay,'57
and provided detailed procedural safeguards.'58
Based upon the eight state supreme court decisions discussing the
sufficiency of standards and safeguards in binding interest arbitra-
tion statutes, some general observations may be made. Regarding
the adequacy of standards, there are two opposing points of view:
some courts require arbitration statutes to state specific standards
in the form of factors for arbitrators to consider in rendering their
awards;'59 other courts demand only general primary standards.6 0 If
155. Town of Arlington v. Board of Conciliation & Arbitration, - Mass. - ... 352
N.E.2d 914, 916 (1976); City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, 37 N.Y.2d 19, 27, 332 N.E.2d 290, 293,
371 N.Y.S.2d 404, 408 (1975); City of Spokane v. Spokane Police Guild, - Wash. 2d __,
-, 553 P.2d 1316, 1319-20 (1976). See Dearborn Fire Fighters Local 412 v. City of Dearborn,
394 Mich. 229, __ 231 N.W.2d 226, 236-37 (1975).
156. Town of Arlington v. Board of Conciliation & Arbitration, - Mass_ -... 352
N.E.2d 914, 916, (1976); Dearborn Fire Fighters Local 412 v. City of Dearborn, 394 Mich. 229,
-, 231 N.W.2d 226, 232 (1975); City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, 37 N.Y.2d 19, 27, 332 N.E.2d
290, 293, 371 N.Y.S.2d 404, 408 (1975); City of Spokane v. Spokane Police Guild, -_ Wash.
2d __, __, 553 P.2d 1316, 1318 (1976).
157. See Town of Arlington v. Board of Conciliation & Arbitration, - Mass. - -
352 N.E.2d 914, 919 & n.5 (1976), quoting Act of Nov. 26, 1973, 1973 Mass. Acts ch. 1078, §
4 (see note 47 supra); Dearborn Fire Fighters Local 412 v. City of Dearborn, 394 Mich. 229,
- & n.40, 231 N.W.2d 226, 236 & n.40 (1975), quoting MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.239
(Cur. Supp. 1976-1977); City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, 37 N.Y.2d 19, 27, 332 N.E.2d 290,
299, 371 N.Y.S.2d 404, 408 (1975); Id. at 37 & n.4, 332 N.E.2d at 299 & n.4, 371 N.Y.S.2d at
417 & n.4 (concurring opinion), quoting N.Y. Civ. SERY. LAW § 209(4)(c)(v) (McKinney Cur.
Supp. 1975-1976). See also City of Spokane v. Spokane Police Guild, - Wash. 2d -,
__ 553 P.2d 1316, 1320 (1976), citing WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 41.56.460 (Supp. 1975).
158. Town of Arlington v. Board of Conciliation & Arbitration, - Mass.... -, -,
352 N.E.2d 914, 917 n.3, 919 (1976), citing Act of Nov. 26, 1973, 1973 Mass. Acts ch. 1078 §
4; Dearborn Fire Fighters Local 412 v. City of Dearborn, 394 Mich. 229, -, 231 N.W.2d
226, 236 (1975); City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, 37 N.Y.2d 19, 27, 332 N.E.2d 290, 293, 37
N.Y.S.2d 404, 408 (1975); Id. at 37-39, 332 N.E.2d at 300-01, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 417-18 (con-
curring opinion). City of Spokane v. Spokane Police Guild, - Wash. 2d - , - , 553
P.2d 1316, 1320 (1976), citing WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 41.56.450 (Supp. 1975). The New York
statute does not require written findings of fact nor a written opinion. See N.Y. CIv. SERV.
LAW § 209(4)(c)(iii) (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1975-1976).
159. City of Biddeford v. Biddeford Teachers Ass'n, 304 A.2d 387, 398 (Me. 1973) (evenly
divided court); Town of Arlington v. Board of Conciliation & Arbitration, - Mass. -,
- 352 N.E.2d 914, 920 (1976); Dearborn Fire Fighters Local 412 v. City of Dearborn, 394
Mich. 229, -, 231 N.W.2d 226, 258 (1975); City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, 37 N.Y.2d 19,
27, 332 N.E.2d 290, 293, 371 N.Y.S.2d 404, 408 (1975); City of Warwick v. Warwick Regular
Firemen's Ass'n, 106 R.I. 109, 256 A.2d 206 (1969); City of Spokane v. Spokane Police Guild,
- Wash. 2d -, -, 553 P.2d 1316, 1319-20 (1976).
160. City of Biddeford v. Biddeford Teachers Ass'n, 304 A.2d 387, 403 (Me. 1973) (evenly
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a binding interest arbitration statute empowers the arbitrators to
create substantial public debt by permitting wage, pension, and
other monetary awards, specific standards usually are required."' A
"primary standard" or "intelligible principle" derived from a legis-
lative statement of purpose is sufficient if arbitrators are given no
authority to create public debt.6 2 If, however, a statute provides for
binding arbitration only on matters such as working conditions,
which require relatively modest public expenditures, authority is
divided whether primary or specific standards are constitutionally
mandated."3 Thus, the more extensive the power to create public
debt the more specific the standards must be.' 4 When no specific
standards are stated, however, courts have upheld arbitration laws
granting arbitrators power to produce substantial public debt only
if a constitutional provision expressly provides for delegation to
arbitrators'65 or if the issue of standards was never raised.'
Two general comments about statutory procedural safeguards
against arbitrary exercise of discretion by arbitration may be made:
first, judicial review of an arbitration award is always available,
whether or not the arbitration statute so provides;6 7 second, if a
statute requires arbitrators to make written findings of fact or to
keep a verbatim record of all proceedings, the safeguards are ade-
quate.'68 Only one court has considered a statute that required nei-
ther findings of fact nor verbatim records.6 9 Half of the justices
divided court); Division 85, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Port Auth., 417 Pa. 299,
208 A.2d 271, 275 (1965).
161. See notes 130, 132, 155-57 supra & accompanying text.
162. See Division 85, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Port Auth., 417 Pa. 299, -, 208
A.2d 271, 275 (1965).
163. See City of Biddeford v. Biddeford Teachers Ass'n, 304 A.2d 287 (Me. 1973) (evenly
divided court).
164. City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, 37 N.Y.2d 19, 36, 332 N.E.2d 290, 299, 371 N.Y.S.2d
404, 416 (1975) (concurring opinion).
165. Harney v. Russo, 435 Pa. 183, -, 255 A.2d 560, 562-63 (1969).
166. Wyoming ex rel. Fire Fighters Local 946 v. City of Laramie, 437 P.2d 295 (Wyo. 1969).
But see McAvoy, supra note 4, at 1206.
167. See notes 208-09 infra & accompanying text.
168. Town of Arlington v. Board of Conciliation & Arbitration, - Mass. 352
N.E.2d 914, 919 (1976); Dearborn Firefighters Local 412 v. City of Dearborn, 394 Mich. 229,
-, 231 N.W.2d 226, 236-37 (1975); City of Spokane v. Spokane Police Guild, - Wash.
2d - ... 553 P.2d 1316, 1320 (1976).
169. See City of Biddeford v. Biddeford Teachers Ass'n, 304 A.2d 387 (Me. 1973). Without
commenting on the lack of a requirement of written findings or verbatim record, the Court
of Appeals of New York held that judicial review alone was an adequate safeguard. City of
Amsterdam v. Helsby, 37 N.Y.2d 19, 332 N.E.2d 290, 371 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1975). Two statutes
not providing for written findings or verbatim record have been upheld by the Supreme Court
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deemed the statute constitutional because it provided for hearings
and judicial review; 7' the remaining justices deemed the statute
invalid because it required no written findings of fact. 7' Because
judicial review of whether arbitrators acted capriciously would be
meaningless unless the reviewing court had some means of deter-
mining the grounds for the arbitrators' decision, a minimal safe-
guard requirement of written findings of fact or verbatim record is
necessary.
Yet, as noted previously, a number of states have enacted public
mass transit binding interest arbitration statutes lacking any such
standards and safeguards. Assuming that these statutes authorize
arbitrators to create public debt by making wage decisions and
other monetary awards, they may be unconstitutional. The first
attack on an arbitration statute covering mass transit workers is
presently pending before the Supreme Court of New Jersey.'72
Challengers contend that the statute is unconstitutional because it
fails to require the arbitration panel to consider the public interest
in maintaining an inexpensive mass transit system and the public
transit authority's ability to pay increased wages.' Moreover,
they contend that if the arbitrators' award is upheld, monetary
expenditures would increase substantially, forcing the urban
transit system out of business."7
Increasingly, public employers are asserting the inability to pay
arbitration awards.'75 The City of Buffalo, for example, currently is
seeking reversal of a three million dollar wage increase decision
which the city asserts would "bring the city to its financial knees."'76
In view of the apparent excessiveness of some awards, statutes must
require arbitrators to consider the public employer's ability to pay.
Minimally, arbitrators should review current revenues and the com-
of Pennsylvania, which never addressed the issue of safeguards. Harney v. Russo, 435 Pa. 183,
255 A.2d 560 (1969); Division 85, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Port Auth., 417 Pa. 299,
208 A.2d 271 (1965).
170. See note 144 supra & accompanying text.
171. See note 153 supra & accompanying text.
172. Division 540, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Mercer Improvement Auth., Civil No.
12381 (Sup. Ct. N.J., filed May 27, 1976), cert. granted, No. 12381C-160.
173. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 8, Division 540, Amalgamated Transit Union v.
Mercer Improvement Auth., Civil No. 12381 (Sup. Ct. N.J., filed May 27, 1976), cert.
granted, No. 12381C-160.
174. Id. at 4-5.
175. See note 10 supra & accompanying text.
176. Buffalo v. Patrolman's Benevolent Ass'n (pending before N.Y. Sup. Ct.), summarized
in [1976] Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 674, B-10.
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munity's capacity to absorb tax increases. To insure that the arbi-
trators heed such limitations, state legislatures should provide ade-
quate procedural safeguards, because, as Professor Davis notes,
[aluthority of a single officer to act impetuously against a par-
ticular party's vital interests without procedural safeguards is
quite different from authority of a regularly constituted agency,
having its own internal checks and balances, to take evidence, to
hear argument, to consider briefs, and then to make findings
based on the record, and to write a reasoned opinion, with all that
is done not only subject to judicial review but also with a record
that helps the reviewing court to keep the agency within the
bounds of reasonableness.'77
Thus, whatever the need for limitations on administrative author-
ity, the need for checks on the arbitrators' discretion is even greater
because arbitration boards usually are ad hoc groups, and, unlike
regularly constituted agencies, are entirely unaccountable to the
public.
(4) Do Arbitrators Have Taxing Powers?
Although several binding arbitration statutes have been attacked
on the ground that they unconstitutionally delegate the taxing
power, the courts have rejected that argument.' In a Michigan
case,' for example, the public employer claimed that because a
wage increase award could be paid only by imposing new taxes, the
power to grant pay raises constituted an indirect power to raise
taxes.8 0 The court rejected that contention, noting that because the
city could adjust for wage increases awarded either by raising taxes
or by decreasing other public expenditures,' the city's power to tax
remained intact.8" For, as asserted by the Massachusetts Supreme
177. K. DAVIS, supra note 116, § 2.06, at 41.
178. See, e.g., Dearborn Fire Fighters Local 412 v. City of Dearborn, 394 Mich. 229, __,
231 NW.2d 226, 230 (1975); City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, 37 N.Y.2d 19, 27-28, 332 N.E.2d
290, 293, 371 N.Y.S.2d 404, 408 (1975); City of Spokane v. Spokane Police Guild, - Wash.
2d - . .. 553 P.2d 1316, 1318-19 (1976).
179. Dearborn Fire Fighters Local 412 v. City of Dearborn, 394 Mich. 229, 231 N.W.2d 226,
(1975).
180. Id. at __, 231 N.W.2d at 230.
181. Id. at __, 231 N.W.2d at 230. See also City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, 37 N.Y.2d 19,
41, 332 N.E.2d 290, 302, 371 N.Y.S.2d 404, 420 (1975) (concurring opinion).
182. 394 Mich. at __, 231 N.W.2d at 252 (separate opinion).
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Judicial Court, the power to establish salaries does not equal the
power to appropriate the funds for them.'83
c. Conflicting City Charters
Binding interest arbitration statutes also have often been chal-
lenged on the ground that they violate state constitution "home
rule" provisions. The courts, however, consistently have rebuffed
these attacks.'84 Numerous state constitutions have "home rule"
clauses that typically empower each municipality to adopt resolu-
tions and ordinances relating to its municipal concerns, property,
and government, subject to the constitution and law. 8 ' These home
rule powers will sustain an exercise of authority pursuant to local
laws and ordinances regarding the regulation of matters involving
wages, hours, and working conditions of public employees "only to
the extent that such exercise is not inconsistent with any general
law enacted by the [1legislature."''8 Because binding interest arbi-
tration statutes are general laws, local governments must abide by
their provisions. 7 Therefore, an arbitration panel's award pursuant
to a binding interest arbitration statute enacted by a state legisla-
ture supersedes any conflicting city charter provision prohibiting
arbitration'88 even though the arbitration decision indirectly may
affect a city's fiscal and budgetary process' and influence a city's
policies pertaining to public employees.9 9
183. Town of Arlington v. Board of Conciliation & Arbitration, - Mass. 352
N.E.2d 914, 919-20 (1976).
184. See, e.g., Town of Arlington v. Board of Conciliation, & Arbitration, - Mass. -,
__ 352 N.E.2d 914, 918 (1976); Dearborn Fire Fighters Local 412 v. City of Dearborn, 394
Mich. 229, -, 231 N.W.2d 226, 229-30 (1975); City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, 37 N.Y.2d
19, 26-27, 332 N.E.2d 290, 292-93, 371 N.Y.S.2d 404, 407-08 (1975).
185. See, e.g., MICH. CONST. art. 4, § 22.
186. City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, 37 N.Y.2d 19, 26, 332 N.E.2d 290, 293, 371 N.Y.S.2d
404, 407 (1975).
187. Town of Arlington v. Board of Conciliation & Arbitration, __ Mass. ,352
N.E.2d 914, 918 (1976); City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, 37 N.Y.2d 19, 27, 332 N.E.2d 290, 293,
371 N.Y.S.2d 404, 407 (1975).
188. Town of Arlington v. Board of Conciliation & Arbitration, - Mass. 352
N.E.2d 914, 918 (1976).
189. Dearborn Fire Fighters Local 412 v. City of Dearborn, 394 Mich. 229, , 231 N.W.2d
226, 248 (1975) (separate opinion).
190. See Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Detroit, 391' Mich. 44, __, 214 N.W.2d
803, 810-12 (1974).
[Vol. 18:787
PUBLIC SECTOR ARBITRATION
d. Binding Interest Arbitration Without State Statutory
Authority
Delegation problems pursuant to arbitration of labor disputes in
states making no provision for binding interest arbitration arise in
two contexts: if a city charter permits or requires public sector arbi-
tration, 9 ' or if, absent any state or local statutory authority, a pub-
lic employer and its employees agree to submit unresolved issues to
binding arbitration.192
A state constitution or statute prohibiting a local legislative body
from delegating its powers to arbitrators clearly voids any city
charter provision allowing binding interest arbitration.'93 In the ab-
sence of such prohibition, however, authority is divided whether city
charter authorization of binding interest arbitration is valid. The
Supreme Court of California has upheld delegation to arbitrators if
a city charter expressly provides for interest arbitration. 94 The ma-
jority of decisions, however, have invalidated charter provisions per-
mitting binding interest arbitration on the ground that delegations
to arbitrators who are unaccountable to the public are unconstitu-
tional,'95 for "[tihe theory of delegation of authority is that the
person or group, to whom authority has been delegated, acts for and
as the agent of the person or group delegating such authority.""'
Because it is doubtful that a city has power to delegate even when
191. See, e.g., Bagley v. City of Manhattan Beach, - Cal. 3d -_, 553 P.2d 1140, 132
Cal. Rptr. 668 (1976); Fire Fighters Union, Local 1186 v. City of Vallejo, 12 Cal. 3d 608, 526
P.2d 971, 116 Cal. Rptr. 507 (1974); Greeley Police Union v. City Council of Greeley,
Colo. __, 553 P.2d 790 (1976); City of Aurora v. Aurora Firefighters Protective Ass'n, No.
26743 (Adams County Colo. Dist. Ct., April 22, 1976), summarized in [1976] Gov'T EMPL.
REL. REP. (BNA) No. 670, B-13-14.
192. See, e.g., Taylor Fed'n of Teachers Local 1085 v. Board of Educ., Civil No. 76-603-
818 CL (Wayne City Mich. Cir. Ct., March 12, 1976), summarized in [1976] Gov'T EMPL.
REL. REP. (BNA) No. 663, B-9.
193. See Bagley v. City of Manhattan Beach, - Cal. 3d .... 553 P.2d 1140, 1143,
132 Cal. Rptr. 668, 671 (1976) (statute); Greeley Police Union v. City Council of Greeley, -
Colo. -, 553 P.2d 790, 792 (1976) (constitution).
194. Fire Fighters Union, Local 1186 v. City of Vallejo, 12 Cal. 3d 608, 622 & n.13, 526 P.2d
971, 980-81 & n.13, 116 Cal. Rptr. 507, 516-17 & n.13 (1974). See Bagley v. City of Manhattan
Beach,__ Cal. 3d _,___ n. 1, 553 P.2d 1140, 1143 n.1, 132 Cal. Rptr. 668, 671 n.1 (1976).
195. Greeley Police Union v. City Council of Greeley, - Colo. -, -, 553 P.2d 790,
792 (1976); Washington ex rel. Everett Fire Fighters Local 350 v. Johnson, 46 Wash. 2d 114,
__ 278 P.2d 662, 666 (1955); City of Aurora v. Aurora Firefighters Protective Ass'n, No.
26743 (Adams County Colo. Dist. Ct., April 22, 1976), summarized in [1976] Gov'T EMPL.
REL. REP. (BNA) No. 670, B-14. See notes 106-11 supra & accompanying text.
196. Washington ex rel. Everett Fire Fighters Local 350 v. Johnson, 46 Wash. 2d 114,
278 P.2d 662, 666 (1955).
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authorized by charter and because voluntary grievance arbitration
constitutes an unlawful delegation absent an express statutory pro-
vision,'97 voluntary interest arbitration apparently is unconstitu-
tional if neither the state legislature nor a city charter permits bind-
ing interest arbitration. A Michigan circuit court, however, recently
held that a school board may voluntarily agree to binding arbitra-
tion of the terms of a collective bargaining agreement with a repre-
sentative of its employees." 8 Other courts probably will not follow
this decision absent statutory or charter authorization; in particu-
lar, the Supreme Court of Michigan, which is evenly divided on
whether arbitration is lawful pursuant to statute, 19 may well re-
verse.
2. Separation of Powers
All state constitutions vest legislative powers in the state legisla-
tive body and provide that under the separation of powers doctrine
these powers cannot be delegated to the judiciary.90° In view of this
doctrine, binding interest arbitration statutes may be attacked on
three grounds. First, separation of power problems arise if a judge
is given a statutory role in the selection process of an arbitration
panel20 1 that makes decisions regarding legislative matters. One
justice has questioned whether the selection of arbitrators is a
legislative function and as such should not be vested in the judici-
ary.210 Although another court rejected this argument,0 " to prevent
197. See Greeley Police Union v. City Council of Greeley, - Colo. - , -, 553 P.2d
790, 792 (1976); Fellows v. LaTronica, 151 Colo. 300, __, 377 P.2d 547, 550-51 (1962); San
Francisco Fire Fighters Local 798 v. City of San Francisco, 129 Cal. Rptr. 39 (1976).
198. Taylor Fed'n of Teachers Local 1085 v. Board of Educ., Civil No. 76-603-818 CL
(Wayne City Cir. Ct., Mar. 12, 1976), summarized in [19761 Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA)
No. 663, B-9, B-10.
199. See notes 106-09 supra & accompanying text.
200. See, e.g., MIcH. CONST. art. 3, § 2. "The powers of government are divided into three
branches; legislative, executive and judicial. No person exercising powers of one branch shall
exercise powers properly belonging to another branch except as expressly provided in this
constitution." Id.
201. See, e.g., Wvo. STAT. § 27-270 (1967) and note 36 supra.
202. See City of Warwick v. Warwick Regular Firemen's Ass'n, 106 R.I. 109, 119, 256 A.2d
206, 212 (1969) (remarks of the trial justice).
203. Wyoming ex rel. Fire Fighters Local 946 v. City of Laramie, 437 P.2d 295, 302 (Wyo.
1968). But see Local 170, Transport Workers Union v. Gadola, 322 Mich. 332, 34 N.W.2d 71,
77-78 (1948) (arbitration statute covering public utility employees, providing that a judge be
the third arbitrator when the parties cannot agree, held invalid); City of Warwick v. Warwick
Regular Firemen's Ass'n, 106 R.I. 109, 119, 256 A.2d 206, 212 (1969) (court declined to decide
the issue).
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future challenges on this basis state legislatures should eliminate
judicial participation in the selection of arbitrators.
A second challenge based upon the separation of powers doctrine
was raised in a South Dakota case 04 concerning a statute that pro-
vided an appeal de novo from arbitration orders. 05 The theory of the
claim was that, when such an appeal de novo was available, a dele-
gation of legislative powers to arbitrators constituted an unconstitu-
tional delegation of power to the courts whose decisions ultimately
would be "final and binding" as to the legislative matters in issue.
Although the Supreme Court of South Dakota voided the arbitra-
tion law on other grounds,0 ' and therefore never discussed the sepa-
ration of powers question, 27 the argument has substantial merit.
Thus, state legislatures should avoid provisions for de novo appeal
from arbitration decisions.
A third possible separation of powers violation would be that
binding interest arbitration statutes unlawfully confer upon the ju-
diciary an implied power to reallocate public funds or to order tax
increases even though a public employer may be financially incapa-
ble of paying an arbitration award. The Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania, for example, asserted in dicta that although such implied
powers appear to be an unlawful delegation of legislative authority
to the courts, the statute conferred it upon them.0 s To guard against
this claim, binding interest arbitration statutes should require that
arbitrators consider the employer's ability to pay prior to rendering
a final, enforceable decision.
3. Fourteenth Amendment Challenges
In addition to attacks based upon provisions in state constitu-
tions, binding interest arbitration statutes have been challenged on
due process and equal protection grounds.
a. Due Process
Binding interest arbitration statutes have been challenged as vio-
lative of fourteenth amendment procedural due process guarantees
204. City of Sioux Falls v. Sioux Falls Firefighters Local 814, S.D. __, 234 N.W.2d
35 (1975).
205. S.D. COMPILED LAWs ANN. § 9-14A-19 (Supp. 1976).
206. See note 89 supra & accompanying text.
207. - S.D. at _, 234 N.W.2d at 38.
208. Harney v. Russo, 435 Pa. 183, -, 255 A.2d 560, 564-65 (1969).
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on two theories. For example, New York's interest arbitration law
covering policemen and firemen has been attacked on the ground
that the statute's failure to provide expressly for judicial review of
arbitration awards denied the city due process. 09 Rejecting this ar-
gument, the court noted that the act did not attempt to prohibit
judicial review and that even if it did, procedural due process none-
theless was guaranteed in that the courts still would have power to
review whether the arbitrators acted in excess of their statutory
grant of authority or in disregard of statutorily mandated stan-
dards." 0
A second type of due process challenge arose in a case21' in which
the public employer claimed a denial of due process because it could
be held in contempt for failing to implement an arbitration award
even though tax limitations might leave the employer with insuffi-
cient funds to do so."' The court refused to decide the issue because
the public employer did not show on the record that it lacked ability
to pay the arbitration award."' Again, a simple means of avoiding
similar due process claims would be to require that arbitrators con-
sider the employer's ability to pay.
b. Equal Protection
Some courts also have contended that the method by which arbi-
trators are selected under binding interest arbitration statutes con-
travenes the "one man, one vote" principle, thus violating equal
protection requirements.2 '4 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court, however, has held the "one man, one vote" principle inap-
plicable to arbitration statutes.2"5 In so holding, the court followed
209. City of Buffalo v. New York State Public Employment Relations Board, 80 Misc. 2d
741, __, 363 N.Y.S.2d 896, 899 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
210. Id. at -, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 899. Even if appeal from an arbitration award is prohib-
ited by statute, a court may review questions of jurisdiction, the regularity of the proceedings
before the panel, questions of abusive exercise of power, and constitutional issues. Skiles v.
City of Lancaster, - Pa. Commw. Ct. - , - , 358 A.2d 131, 133 (1976), citing Washing-
ton Arbitration Case, 436 Pa. 168, 259 A.2d 437 (1969).
211. Harney v. Russo, 435 Pa. 183, 255 A.2d 560 (1969).
212. Id. at __, 255 A.2d at 564-65.
213. Id. at __, 255 A.2d at 566.
214. E.g., Town of Arlington v. Board of Conciliation & Arbitration, __ Mass. -, -,
352 N.E.2d 914, 920-21 (1976); City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, 37 N.Y.2d 19, 27-28,, 332 N.E.2d
290, 293, 371 N.Y.S.2d 404, 408 (1975); Harney v. Russo, 435 Pa. 183, -, 255 A.2d 560,
564 (1969).
215. Town of Arlington v. Board of Conciliation & Arbitration, __ Mass. -, 352
N.E.2d 914 (1976).
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two Supreme Court decisions"'8 indicating that the principle applies
only to bodies having general legislative powers.21 7 An arbitration
panel is purely administrative, for it is neither "a unit of local gov-
ernment with general responsibility and power for local affairs" nor
a unit "with general governmental powers over an entire geographi-
cal area. ' 21 As the court noted, powers granted to school boards,
which are not even general legislative powers within the scope of the
"one man, one vote" principle, are broader than those granted to
arbitrators." Thus, the allegation that binding interest arbitration
violates equal protection appears untenable."'
III. BINDING INTEREST ARBITRATION STATUTES MAY INTERFERE WITH
SOCIETAL NEEDS
Many binding interest arbitration statutes permit arbitrators,
who serve on a temporary basis and are politically unaccountable,
to award wage and other increases requiring expenditure of tax dol-
lars, without considering the public employer's, and therefore the
public's, ability to pay. Furthermore, binding interest arbitration
awards rendered after budget appropriations have been made may
require substantial budgetary reallocations. Arbitration, then, can
lead to disruption of public services and financial confusion.
Because arbitrators are removed from the political process, public
employees may make unrealistic demands during negotiations, be-
lieving that arbitrators will be more sympathetic than the city gov-
ernment. Similarly, the public employer, believing an arbitrator
ultimately will compromise disputed issues, may maintain unrea-
sonable positions. The net effect may be that the purpose of collec-
tive bargaining, to encourage voluntary agreements between em-
ployer and employee, may be thwarted by binding interest arbitra-
tion. Moreover, strikes and employee dissatisfaction have contin-
ued, even though binding interest arbitration statutes were enacted
to harmonize employer-employee relations.
These aspects of the arbitration process are antithetical to the
216. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968); Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387 U.S.
105 (1967).
217. - Mass. at __, 352 N.E.2d at 920.
218. Id. at -, 352 N.E.2d at 921, quoting Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 485-
86 (1968).
219. - Mass. at __, 352 N.E.2d at 921, citing Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387 U.S. 105,
110-11 (1967).
220. 435 Pa. 183, __, 255 A.2d 560, 564 (1969).
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needs and desires of the public employer and the public in general.
As a result, public employers increasingly have refused to submit
disputed issues to arbitrators or to implement arbitration orders.
Consequently, the enforcement of some arbitration laws of dubious
constitutionality has spawned expensive and time-consuming litiga-
tion. Such a result is detrimental to public employees because it
delays the execution of financial awards, and it harms the public
because tax dollars, originally intended for purchasing public goods
and services, are dissipated in litigation. Thoughtful drafting of
binding interest arbitration statutes, however, can insure that the
statutes are impervious to constitutional attack and concomitantly
can insure that they better serve the needs of all parties.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
To mitigate the claim of unaccountability and the resultant alle-
gation of unlawful delegation, binding interest arbitration statutes
should require that a public officer who is either elected or responsi-
ble to an elected official choose the arbitrator-chairman or provide
a list of arbitrators from which the chairman is selected.2 More-
over, any judicial involvement in arbitration panel selection or com-
position should be avoided to prevent claims that the selection pro-
cess violates the separation of powers doctrine.
To encourage voluntary agreements and to protect against unrea-
sonable demands during negotiations, the terms of the award should
reflect each party's "final offer" on each disputed issue2 , and bind-
ing interest arbitration statutes should provide that the parties
share the expenses of arbitration proceedings. 23
Most importantly, to ensure the constitutional validity of binding
interest arbitration laws and to prevent costly and time-consuming
litigation, the statutes should contain specific standards to be con-
sidered by the arbitrators, in particular the ability of the employer
to pay, and adequate procedural safeguards, including hearings,
written findings and opinion, verbatim record, judicial review, and
provisions to prevent budgetary disruptions.
V. CONCLUSION
The interests of the general public, which seeks quality public
221. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.802 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1976-1977).
222. See notes 39-42 supra & accompanying text.
223. See notes 43-46 supra & accompanying text.
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services at the lowest possible cost, conflict with the interests of
public employees, who are attempting to maximize their financial
status. In an attempt to bridge the gap between public employers
and public employees, an increasing number of states are enacting
binding interest arbitration statutes.
The provisions in public sector arbitration laws vary greatly from
state to state; if poorly drafted, a binding interest arbitration stat-
ute may be vulnerable to constitutional attack on the grounds of
unlawful delegation, violation of the separation of powers doctrine,
and unconstitutional interference with fourteenth amendment re-
quirements. Additionally, carelessly worded arbitration statutes,
enacted to ease employer-employee relations, may in reality inter-
fere with the needs and desires of the public employer, the public
employee, and the public in general. If carefully drafted, however,
binding interest arbitration statutes are likely to withstand consti-
tutional challenge and to ease significantly the resolution of public
sector labor disputes.
